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Abstract: Searle’s analysis and classifi cation of speech acts entails that one of 
the two components of a speech act is a proposition. Th e fi rst part of the article 
demonstrates that the analysis and classifi cation is misleading when applied 
to three authentic examples of questions embedded in an everyday activity. 
Considerations concerning the situations that give rise to the questions 
suggest that the discrepancy is due to assumptions about intentionality and 
perception implied by the proposition-based analysis and classifi cation of 
speech acts. In the second part of the article, Searle’s theory of intentionality 
and perception is compared with cognitive ethnographic observations of the 
situations that give rise to the three questions. Th e comparison shows that 
Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception is insuffi  ciently informative 
and partly misleading as regards human intentionality and perception in the 
performance of an everyday activity. Th e claim is that the assumptions about 
intentionality and perception that form the basis of the proposition-based 
analysis and classifi cation of speech acts are insuffi  cient as a basis for a general 
theory of speech acts. 
Keywords: speech acts, classifi cation, questions, intentionality, perception, 
cognitive ethnography
1. An adequate basis for a general theory of speech acts: purpose and 
outline
In this article, I will identify and discuss a problem in speech act theory. Th e 
problem appears when Searle’s analysis of the general form of speech acts, 
F(p), is applied to everyday language use. Searle’s analysis implies that one of 
the two components of a simple speech act is a proposition, but many speech 
acts do not contain a proposition. Th is discrepancy is, of course, recognized 
by Searle, but it is treated as a semantic detail that poses no challenge to the 
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analysis of the general form. However, if one considers what the proposition-
based analysis entails concerning the speech situation, it appears that the 
discrepancy refl ects a far more comprehensive and fundamental problem that 
has something to do with our relation to the world as humans, more specifi cally 
with what we direct our attention to in the environment, what we perceive, and 
how we perceive. Hence, the primary aim of this article is to raise awareness 
of what the proposition-based analysis of speech acts entails concerning our 
relation to the world in terms of intentionality and perception. Th e claim is 
that the assumptions about intentionality and perception that form the basis of 
Searle’s proposition-based analysis of speech acts are inadequate as a basis for 
a general theory of speech acts, and that an informative and accurate analysis 
of certain types of commonly used speech acts requires an alternative basis. 
 Th e idea that speech acts include a proposition is found in a wide range 
of linguistic descriptions, characteristics, classifi cations, and typologies, both 
of speech acts in general and of specifi c classes of speech acts. Th e reason for 
choosing Searle’s theory as the subject of scrutiny is that the analysis, F(p), 
originates in Searle’s (1969) theory of speech acts, that the theory has been 
pervasive, that it is explicit and quite precise with regard to the function of the 
proposition in a speech act, and fi nally that it is, in fact, based on a theory of 
intentionality and perception. Th us, the criticism here is directed at Searle’s 
analysis. However, the fact that the proposition-based analysis is widely 
shared suggests that this criticism of Searle’s analysis may be relevant to all of 
the descriptions of everyday language use that assume that the proposition is 
a component of speech acts in general – indeed to any direct and unrefl ected 
use of the term ‘proposition’ in the analysis of everyday language use. 
 Th e basis for the identifi cation of the problem can be found in three 
authentic examples of questions forming part of an activity of everyday life. 
Th e examples derive from a cognitive ethnographic (Hutchins 1995) study 
with particular regard to the socio-cognitive tasks (Harder 2010) that language 
fulfi lls (Borchmann 2019, 2018, 2016). Th e advantage of this method with 
regard to the issues of intentionality and perception is that it provides access 
to ample information concerning the language users’ knowledge and skills, the 
practical and cognitive tasks (Cook 1994, Vicente and Rasmussen 1992, Roth 
and Woods 1989, Rasmussen 1985) that the language users are confronted with 
and need to solve, the non-linguistic behavior that accompanies the linguistic 
behavior and serves as criteria for the understanding of the linguistic behavior 
(Wittgenstein 2009/1953), the goals and values (Hodges 2007, Hodges and 
Baron 1992) that guide the activity that the speech acts are part of, and the 
lawful constraints that set the boundary conditions on the space of possibilities 
(Flach and Rasmussen 2000, Rasmussen et al 1993).      
 First, I will outline Searle’s analysis and classifi cation of speech acts. Next, I 
will show that Searle’s analysis and classifi cation are misleading when applied 
to three simple, ordinary speech acts in everyday language use. In section 
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4, I will consider the origin of the discrepancy between Searle’s analysis and 
the speech acts, starting with the situations in which the speech acts arise. 
Th ese considerations point to Searle’s assumptions about the cognitive 
basis of speech acts, i.e. the understanding of the world that motivates and 
guides the use of language. In Section 5, Searle’s theory of intentionality and 
perception is outlined, and then, in section 6, I will show that some of the 
assumptions that characterize Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception 
are in confl ict with what one can observe in the situations that give rise to the 
three speech acts investigated. In section 7, I will compare the aforementioned 
situations with the situation that Searle’s theory derives from and explain the 
discrepancy by pointing out that the subject of Searle’s theory is intentionality 
and perception in an idle state whereas the subject of the observations of 
everyday life is intentionality and perception in operation. Following that line 
of thought, I will consider two internal discrepancies in Searle’s presentation 
of the theory of intentionality and perception. Section 8 comprises some fi nal 
considerations and a conclusion.
2. Searle’s analysis and classifi cation of speech acts
2.1. Th e analysis of speech acts
Searle’s theory implies that speech acts can be analyzed in two components. Th e 
analysis is represented using the following symbolism, where F and p represent 
each of the two components (Searle 2010:7, 1996/1979:1, 1996/1969:31): 
F(p)
p stands for propositional content. In “the simple cases”, the propositional 
content is a combination of a reference, e.g. Sam, and a predicating expression, 
e.g. smoke (Searle 1996/1969:33). However, Searle considers other semantic 
structures to be p’s, e.g. thetic structures like it rains. Th e reason is that the 
criterion of p is not the structure, but the function. Th e initial defi nition of the 
function of p is that it “raises the question of truth” (Searle 1996/1969:126). 
Th e combination of a reference to Sam and the predicating expression smoke, 
for example, raises the question of truth of smoke of Sam. Th e central point is 
that the combination only raises the question of truth; it does not provide any 
indication of the speaker’s commitment with regard to the truth. Th is function 
is later described in terms of ‘conditions of satisfaction’ (Searle 1996/1979:126-
131). Conditions of satisfaction involve a more general notion than the notion 
of truth conditions. But as regards the function of the propositional content, 
it is basically the same, that is, to determine the conditions the world must 
meet if p is to be true or – as Searle prefers – satisfi ed. Th e conditions of 
satisfaction of the speech act Sam smokes, thus, are that Sam smokes. Searle’s 
concept of conditions of satisfaction is applied to propositions that form a 
part of speech acts and is designed to cope with the fact that a proposition in a 
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speech act may be related to the world in more ways than the way we describe 
with the distinction true/false. A proposition that forms part of a speech 
act can, for example, be related to the world in such a way that the speaker 
wants the world to be changed so that it matches the proposition, e.g.: Sam, 
smoke!. Th e conditions of satisfaction of this speech act are that Sam obeys 
the order and smokes. Certainly, one of the preparatory conditions of this 
speech act is that the proposition is false at the time of speech, but in a theory 
of everyday language use, this is not a suffi  ciently informative characterization 
of the relation between the proposition and the world. It is relations like these 
that the concept of conditions of satisfaction should be able to accommodate. 
Th us, p’s function in a speech act is to determine the conditions the world 
must meet if the speech act is to be satisfi ed. 
 F stands for illocutionary force indicating device and indicates the 
illocutionary force of the speech act. Th e initial defi nition of the function of 
F is that it “shows how the proposition is to be taken” (Searle 1996/1969:30). 
In Searle (1996/1979) this function is accounted for based on the terminology 
of ‘direction of fi t’ invented by Austin (2019/1953). However, Searle refers to 
Anscombe’s (1957) illustration of the distinction, and as Humberstone (1992) 
notes, this is quite diff erent from Austin’s. In Searle’s account, direction of fi t 
covers the possible ways in which a representation of a state of aff airs can 
be related to the world (Searle 1996/1983:7-13, 1996/1979:3-4). Th e starting 
point is that p – in so far as it determines the conditions the world must 
meet - is a representation of a state of aff airs, and, therefore, can match or not 
match the world. Th e symbolism F(p) indicates that F operates on p (Searle 
1996/1969:122) and that the meaning of a speech act is p as a function of F. F 
operates on p by relating p to the world. Th e concept of direction of fi t implies 
that F can relate p to the world in basically two ways: either F indicates that p 
matches the world, or F indicates that the world changes so that it matches p. 
Th e former relation is called word to world direction of fi t, the latter world to 
word direction of fi t. One can then distinguish between more specifi c world 
to word relations, also called illocutionary points (Searle 1999:151, 1996/1979: 
3). One subtype of the world to word relation is speaker-based and implies 
that the speaker must change the world so that it matches p. Another subtype 
is hearer-based and implies that the hearer must change the world so that it 
matches p (Searle 1999:151). Th e analysis can be illustrated by examples that 
include the same proposition in diff erent directions of fi t (revised version of 
Searle 1996/1969:22):
(1)  Sam smokes
(2)  Sam, smoke!
(3)  I, Sam, promise to smoke
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Th ese three speech acts include the same reference and the same predicating 
expression in the same relation of predication. Th e diff erence is that in (1) 
F indicates that p matches the world. In (2) F indicates that the hearer must 
change the world so that it matches p. In (3) F indicates that the speaker will 
change the world so that it matches p.  
     A crucial point in the theory of speech acts is that the proposition is not 
the minimal unit of linguistic communication (Searle 2001/1965:80,85). In 
line with this, Searle presents his analysis in strong opposition to traditional 
semantic descriptions that assume that the proposition is the minimal unit of 
linguistic meaning. But the analysis is nevertheless based on the assumption 
that one of the two basic components of a simple speech act is a proposition. 
Searle does acknowledge that the propositional content of some speech acts 
is not a complete proposition and mentions exclamations such as Hurrah and 
questions such as How many people were at the party (Searle 1996/1969:30-31). 
Likewise, Searle notes that speech acts such as greetings have no propositional 
content (Searle 1996/1969:67). But these observations have no implications 
for the analysis of the general form; this analysis closely follows the simple 
case which, according to Searle, involves reference to a single object and the 
predication of simple expressions, and thus, a proposition. Accordingly, Searle 
presupposes that p is a proposition in the initial defi nition of the function 
of F (see above) and refers to propositions as “entire propositional contents” 
(Searle 2015:34). Furthermore, it is precisely the proposition’s function as a 
specifi cation of conditions of satisfaction in the sense of a representation of a 
state of aff airs that forms the basis for the classifi cation of speech acts. 
2.2. Searle’s classifi cation of speech acts
Searle distinguishes between classes of speech acts based on the indicated 
relation between p and the world. Th e two basic directions of fi t, word to world 
and world to word, form the basis of four classes. Th ere are assertives, i.e. F 
indicates that p matches the world, e.g. (1), directives, i.e. F indicates that the 
hearer must change the world so that it matches p, e.g. (2), commissives, i.e. F 
indicates that the speaker will change the world so that it matches p, e.g. (3), 
and declarations. Declarations are characterized by a double direction of fi t, 
i.e. F implies that the world is changed so that it matches p in that F indicates 
that p matches the world, e.g. the chairperson of the meeting says Th e meeting 
is adjourned. A special kind of direction of fi t is added, which, allegedly, 
consists of not having a relation to the world. Th is relation is called null and 
implies that the speaker associates an emotion with p and presupposes that 
p is true, e.g.: Cool that Sam smokes. Speech acts with null direction of fi t are 
called expressives.
      In section 3, the analysis and classifi cation will be applied to three questions. 
Th e consequence of Searle’s classifi cation is that questions are a subclass of 
directives (Searle 1996/1979:14, 1996/1969:69). Th e basis of this classifi cation 
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is that they are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. 
According to the classifi cation, directives are characterized by a hearer-based 
world to word direction of fi t, that is: “Th e propositional content is always 
that the hearer H does some future action A” (Searle 1996/1979:14). In Searle 
(1999), the illocutionary point of directives is described as: “to get the hearer 
to behave in such a way as to make his behavior match the proposition” (Searle 
1999:149). Th us, if we take the proposition-based analysis and classifi cation of 
speech acts at its word, it means that a question is an attempt to get the hearer 
to behave in such a way as to make his behavior match the proposition.
3. Questions in everyday life
Searle (1999, 1996/1979, 1996/1969, 2001/1965) does not provide a thorough 
semantic and pragmatic analysis of questions (see Mortensen 2020, this issue, 
Nielsen 2020, this issue, for discussions).2 All in all, he does not pay much 
attention to them. However, if you apply the analysis and the associated 
classifi cation to a small set of authentic examples of questions, substantial 
problems arise. Examples (4), (5), and (6) below are authentic examples of 
ordinary, simple speech acts performed by humans in the pursuit of a daily 
life activity. Th e speech acts diff er with regard to their semantic structure, and 
thereby they enable a nuanced examination of the proposition-based analysis 
and classifi cation.
(4)  hvad er skybasen (Pilot on the ground to pilot in the air, Hammer 
Airfi eld 2018) 
 ‘what is the cloud base’ 
(5)  hvem betalte (Pilot student to air fi eld attendant, True Airfi eld 2017)
 ‘who paid’
(6)  er du fastspændt (Pilot student to gliding instructor, True Airfi eld 
2017)
 ‘are you buckled up’
In section 4 and 6, I will present analyses of (4), (5), and (6)3 that involve 
the speakers’ knowledge and abilities, the practical and cognitive tasks they 
are confronted with, as well as other relevant conditions that apply in the 
situations in which the speech acts arise. Th e following analyses are limited 
to the semantic structure with the objective of comparing an analysis of the 
structures with Searle’s analysis and direction of fi t-based classifi cation.
Th e semantic content of (4) is not a proposition. It is incomplete both as 
a predication (Strawson 1974, Searle 1996/1969) and as a specifi cation 
(Borchmann 2018). As a predication, the content is incomplete, since (4) does 
not include a predicating expression. As a specifi cation, (4) is incomplete, since 
it does not include an indication of the state of the identifi ed variation the 
cloud base. One might argue that the speaker’s use of the pronoun hvad ‘what’ 
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presupposes that the cloud base is something. But fi rst of all, this presupposition 
is trivial and irrelevant. It is not part of the information communicated, 
but a prerequisite for the communication. Secondly, presuppositions imply 
a direction of fi t that is contrary to Searle’s characterization of directives. 
Presupposed propositions are assumed to match the world and, hence, have 
a word to world direction of fi t – and it would be pointless to say that the 
illocutionary point of (4) is that the listener4 must change the world so that the 
cloud base is something when the speaker presupposes that it is something. 
Indeed, saying that the listener must change the world so that the cloud base is 
something is a category mistake. Finally, the presupposition ‘the cloudbase is 
something’ is incomplete as a specifi cation of conditions of satisfactions. (4), 
thus, does not include a proposition, and therefore, the content of (4) cannot 
be assigned to a direction of fi t. 
     Referentially, (4) is characterized by the fact that the speaker, by means 
of the expression skybasen ‘the cloud base’, identifi es a variation in the 
environment. A variation is a limited set of mutually exclusive possible states, 
the current state of which is constantly changing within certain constraints 
(Borchmann 2018). Examples of variations are the wind direction, the wind 
speed, the speed of your car, the distance to the car in front of you, the presence 
of vehicles coming from behind, the temperature of your coff ee, the price of 
petrol, the exchange rate, and the time of day. (4) can then be said to diff er 
from a specifi cation in that there is no indication of the state of the variation 
(Borchmann 2018). Instead, the pronoun hvad ‘what’ indicates that the state 
of the identifi ed variation is undetermined, and as a fundament (Hansen & 
Heltoft  2011), i.e. fi rst position in a verb-second clause, the pronoun serves as 
an F indicating that the speaker is asking for an indication of the state of the 
variation. If we try to apply the term direction of fi t to this relation by saying 
that the listener must make the world match the content by indicating the 
state of the variation, we use the term ‘fi t’ to refer to a relation that diff ers from 
the one Searle refers to in the characterisation of directives and elsewhere. Th e 
listener should not do anything to make the world match the propositional 
content. What the listener must do is to indicate the state of the variation that 
the speaker identifi es. Th us, using the term fi t to refer to this relation implies 
a semantic drift  from denoting a relation between a proposition and the 
world, to denoting a relation between an identifi cation of a variation and an 
indication of the state of the variation. Th is relation is not a relation of match 
between a proposition and the world. Pragmatically, it is an interactional 
relation between two speech acts: a request and a response. Semantically, it is 
a relation of exclusion: the speaker identifi es a set of possible states, and the 
listener indicates a state and thereby excludes all the other possible states.  
      (5) can be described semantically as an open proposition, or, with Searle’s 
notion, as a propositional function (Searle 1996/1969:31). It includes a 
predicating expression, but instead of a reference to a referent that fulfi lls the 
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role ‘agent’ specifi ed by the predicating expression betale ‘pay’, the speaker uses 
the pronoun hvem ‘who’, indicating an undetermined variable. Th is implies 
that the determination of the conditions of satisfaction is incomplete, and 
therefore the content of (5) cannot be assigned to a direction of fi t. In other 
words, the term open proposition is not a solution to the problem, but the 
name of the problem. Again, one can argue that the speaker presupposes that 
someone paid. But this presupposition is obvious and part of the meaning of the 
verb betale ‘pay’ at the semantic level of frames, and as such it is a prerequisite 
for the communication rather than a part of the information communicated. 
Surely, it makes no sense to say that the speaker wants the listener to change 
the world so that it matches the open proposition ‘x paid‘. If we try to adapt 
Searle’s fi t-based functional characteristics to the example by saying that the 
listener must make the world match the propositional content by completing 
the proposition, i.e. providing the reference that determines the undetermined 
variable, we use the term ‘fi t’ in a way that diff ers from the way Searle uses it 
elsewhere: What must be changed to match the content is not the world. Th us, 
the listener should not pay anyone anything. Th e listener must perform a 
speech act that provides the speaker with the complement to the propositional 
function. Th is is not a relation between the world and a proposition. Th e use 
of the term ‘fi t’ for this relation implies a drift  from one dimension of the 
communication, namely what the utterance is about, to another dimension 
of the communication, namely the interaction. Again, this relation is not a 
relation of match between the world and a proposition. Pragmatically, it is 
an interactional relation between a request for information and a response. 
Semantically, it is a relation between a variable and an expression that binds 
the variable.
 Th at is, as regards speech acts that do not include a proposition, the 
analysis and the related direction of fi t-based classifi cation are misleading. 
But, in fact, there is also a problem with questions that include a proposition. 
According to Searle’s analysis of the “simple case”, (6) can be said to include 
a proposition. Th us, the verb fastspændt ‘buckled up’ can be considered a 
predicating expression, and the speaker’s use of the deictic pronoun du ‘you’ is 
a reference to the listener. However, the point of the speech act is not that the 
listener should change the world so it matches the proposition. Th e listener 
should not buckle himself up. Th e term fastspændt ‘buckled up’ indicates one 
of two possible states that the back-seat harness system may be in, fastened 
or released, and the listener must confi rm (or disconfi rm) that the system is 
in the fastened state. Again, the application of Searle’s direction of fi t-based 
functional characteristics to such examples implies a drift  from what the speech 
act is about to the linguistic interaction: fi t is no longer a relation between 
the world and a proposition. Instead, it is the illocutionary force indicating 
device that indicates what the listener must do, and what the listener must 
do is not to change world so that it matches the proposition, but to perform 
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a speech act that completes the interaction as indicated by the illocutionary 
force indicating device and constrained by the verbal fastspændt ‘buckled up’. 
      To sum up, if we apply Searle’s direction of fi t-based description of 
directives to questions, it results in several diff erent meanings of the notion 
‘world to word direction of fi t’: 
a) Sam, smoke!: world to word = to change the world so that it matches the 
proposition
b) what is the cloud base: world to word = to indicate the state of a variation 
identifi ed by the speaker
c) who paid: world to word = to identify the referent that fulfi lls the role 
that the speaker specifi es
d) are you buckled up: world to word = to confi rm the state of a variation 
indicated by the speaker
b, c, and d do not conform to the way the concept direction of fi t is defi ned 
by Searle and illustrated by Anscombe’s example. It is true that in some 
pragmatic descriptions, the term ‘fi t’ is used to refer to the relation between 
a speech act and a (rhetorical) situation (Bitzer 1992), and in ecological 
psychology, perception of an aff ordance ‘fi t’, i.e. a relation between an action 
and a possibility for action off ered by the environment, is a major principle of 
selection and learning (Gibson 2000), but this is not how Searle uses the term. 
If we extend the concept to include relations like b, c, and d, we are left  with an 
extremely vague, eclectic notion of fi t. We cannot base an informative analysis 
and classifi cation of speech acts on such vagueness. 
     Within philosophy of language and linguistics it is not an unusual strategy 
to circumvent the problems of such discrepancies between a postulated 
semantic structure and the linguistic material analyzed by altering the 
material and then claiming that the result of the alteration is what the 
language user, in eff ect, is saying. Within linguistics, there is even a name for 
the subject of such alterations. Th us, by classifying the material as an ‘ellipsis’, 
the analyst is allowed to add words to the material so that it corresponds to 
a postulated structure. Th e strategy is based on the idea that the speaker’s 
psychological point of departure is a mental representation that corresponds 
to the postulated structure, and that the missing parts of the representation 
are omitted only in the articulation. In the case of (5), the analyst might, for 
example, alter the authentic utterance hvem betalte ‘who paid’ to sig mig hvem 
der betalte ‘tell me who paid’ (see, for example, Searle 1996/1969:69). Needless 
to say, I am embarrassed on behalf of language sciences when I encounter 
such manipulations. Because the limitations of the strategy in relation to a 
scientifi c description of language and language use are obvious. First of all, 
you cannot claim that what you describe is language or language use. What 
you are doing is projecting a counterfactual ideal – what the speaker should 
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have said according to a hypostatized norm. As if it took a logician to show 
people at last what a proper sentence looks like (Wittgenstein 2009/1953:43). 
Secondly, the description cannot be falsifi ed empirically. It is self-affi  rming 
and immune to observations. Th ese are general scientifi c problems with this 
strategy. But when the strategy of ellipsis is applied to questions, it does not 
even solve the problem. As can be illustrated by the alteration of (5) to sig 
mig hvem der betalte ‘tell me who paid’, the alteration reproduces the fl aw 
as regards the assumed function of the propositional content in directives: 
the variable who is still not bound. Hence, p is not a complete specifi cation 
of how the hearer should behave to make his behavior match p; this would 
require a name of the payer. Here, it becomes clear that it is the very idea of  a 
proposition that is problematic in the description of questions. Th e proposition 
is, by defi nition, a specifi cation of conditions of satisfaction in the sense of a 
complete representation of a state of aff airs. However, the psychological point 
of departure for the articulation of questions like (4) and (5) is precisely an 
inadequate specifi cation, and this is refl ected in the semantics of the questions 
by variables like hvad ‘what’ or hvem ‘who’. Long story short: regardless of the 
way we approach the analysis and classifi cation of the function of speech acts, 
it is a mistake to ignore the particular words and semantic structures that 
characterize them.
     Searle’s distinction between F and p is an important contribution to the 
analysis of speech acts, and the assumption that p specifi es the conditions of 
satisfaction and that F indicates the relation between p and the world, holds 
remarkably well in the case of assertions and promises. But it does not hold in 
general. It should also be noted that Searle (1969:66-67) in describing diff erent 
types of illocutionary acts actually formulates rules that are informative and 
accurate when applied to speech acts such as (4), (5), and (6). Th ese rules, on 
the other hand, are incompatible with the analysis of the general form and the 
direction of fi t based characteristics of the class of directives. Th at is, the above 
application of Searle’s analysis and classifi cation to three simple, ordinary 
speech acts results in discrepancies, and the conclusion is clear: Searle’s 
analysis and classifi cation of speech acts is misleading as regards questions. 
     
4. Considerations on the situations in which the speech acts occur
As I have framed the comparison above, one can immediately pinpoint the 
cause of the discrepancies, namely the assumption that a simple speech act 
includes a proposition and an indication of the proposition’s relation to the 
world. Th is implies that the psychological basis of language production is a 
proposition in some kind of relation to the world. Th at is, as the speaker opens 
the mouth, he or she has a mental content that is complete in the sense that 
it can be converted into a propositional format and, thus, assigned to a truth 
value. Th e problem with this assumption when applied to everyday language 
use is that we oft en speak and write based on understandings of the world that 
are insuffi  cient relative to the solution of the practical task we are confronted 
Simon Borchmann
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (20-55)
30
with. And most importantly, we are speaking and writing precisely to remedy 
this defi ciency. Th is basic condition can be illustrated by the situations of 
(4), (5), and (6) as they are paradigmatic examples of such conditions. (4) 
is performed by a glider pilot on the ground who has to decide whether he 
should take off  now or wait until later. One of the decision factors is the cloud 
base, i.e. the distance between the terrain and the underside of the clouds. If 
it is low, e.g. 700 meters, the pilot will wait to start on the assumption that it 
will rise within the next hour. If it has a suitable height, e.g. 900 meters, he 
will start now. Th e speaker has, in fact, immediate access to the information 
he requests. Th us, if he raises his head, he can see the distance between the 
terrain and the underside of the clouds, and, indeed, the speaker raises his 
head and looks toward the sky several times prior to (4) in order to determine 
the cloud base.
Figure 1. Th e cloud base relative to the speaker’s visual attention in situation (4)
However, the speaker cannot diff erentiate the height with suffi  cient precision 
to make a decision. Th e precision required is beyond the speaker’s perceptual 
ability. Th us, the speaker’s perception is insuffi  cient in relation to the solution 
of the cognitive task he is confronted with. Th erefore, he radios the pilots of 
a glider that took off  a little while ago and that he can see is close to the cloud 
base and asks them what the cloud base is.5 Th e pilots of this glider can look at 
their altimeter, and because they are close to the cloud base, they can estimate 
the vertical distance to it with reasonable accuracy and add the estimate to the 
value indicated by the altimeter. Th at is, (4) is an act to rectify a defi ciency in 
the speaker’s understanding of the world. 
     (5) is uttered by a student glider pilot who has just received a sandwich. 
He now wishes to pay for the sandwich. He knows there have been two 
other students at the bakery to buy sandwiches, and that one of them has 
paid, but he doesn’t know which one, and therefore he doesn’t know who 
to pay. Hence, he lacks information relative to the selection of an action he 
must perform. Th e current defi ciency is due to the fact that the event that 
provides the basis for obtaining the necessary information, precedes the 
situation in which the speaker fi nds himself, and that the speaker was not 
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present at the event. Th erefore, he performs a speech act in order to obtain 
the necessary information. In the current situation, none of the people who 
were at the bakery are there with him, so the speaker then asks a person whom 
he presumes has spoken to those who were present at the event and thereby 
obtained the necessary information. 
     (6) is performed by a student glider pilot who is about to take off  in a 
two-seater with an instructor in the back seat. Th e training involves that the 
student behaves as if she were the commander. Before a commander takes 
off  with a passenger, he or she must ensure that the passenger’s harness is 
fastened. However, the student sits in front of the passenger and cannot see 
the passenger’s harness. 
     Figure 2. Th e speaker’s perspective in situation (6)
Th erefore, as part of a prefl ight procedure, the student asks the instructor if he 
is buckled up.
     In all three cases, the starting point for the language use is an insuffi  ciency 
in the understanding of the world. Th e current defi ciencies are due to various 
conditions. In situation (4), the speaker’s ability to diff erentiate is not good 
enough relative to the precision that his decision requires. In situation (5), 
the speaker is separated in time and place from the event that includes the 
information the speaker needs. In situation (6), the speaker has indirect access 
to the information required. She can open the hood, release her harness, get out 
of the airplane, turn around and face the passenger in the back seat and check 
for herself whether the passenger’s harness is fastened. But this would be time-
consuming and resource intensive, and, hence, inconvenient. What is common 
to the three defi ciencies is that they can be corrected by the use of language. 
Th e examples, thus, illustrate how unique and fantastic a tool language is. In 
situation (4), the speaker can use language to acquire information that exceeds 
his perceptual ability. Th e use of language in this situation even contributes 
to the perceptual ability of the speaker, since the speaker can compare the 
more precise answer with his own perception. In situation (5), the speaker 
can simply transcend time and place by using language; by asking, he can 
get information about a past event that took place miles away from him. In 
situation (6), the speaker can solve a cognitive problem quickly and effi  ciently 
with minimal energy exertion by means of language. Th e examples, thus, 
show how language complements and expands our perceptual system, and, 
Simon Borchmann
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (20-55)
32
hence, also the evolutionary edge that language provides: language is a socio-
cognitive system that enhances our possibilities for coordination of attention 
and action enormously and thereby our possibilities for sharing information, 
cooperating and learning (Tomasello 2008, Deacon 1997). Th e crucial point 
in relation to the semantic analysis of questions is that defi ciencies in our 
understanding of the world are not only the psychological starting point for 
language production, they are also the motive for language production. It is 
therefore plausible that defi ciencies in our understanding of the world are one 
of the driving forces in the development of language. To put it another way, 
questions tell us something fundamental about our species’ relation to the 
world, and if we want to base a description of language on a theory about that 
relation, it is fatal to ignore this.
 Th e above analyses of the situations in which these speech acts occur 
indicate that the problem that arises when the proposition-based analysis 
and classifi cation is applied to everyday language use is not merely a semantic 
problem. It arises, so to speak, prior to the language use and has something 
to do with the cognitive basis of language use. What is it that we direct our 
attention to in the environment, what is it we perceive, and why and how do 
we do it? For that reason, the second part of this article is about intentionality 
and perception. Taking a starting point in an account of the theory of 
intentionality and perception that provides the basis for the analysis and 
classifi cation of speech acts presented in the fi rst part of the article, I will argue 
that the problem is comprehensive and fundamental.
    
5. Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception 
Th e basis for the assumption that the proposition is a fundamental component 
of a speech act is explicit in Searle’s philosophy. Th us, Searle’s theory of speech 
acts is based on a theory of intentionality (Searle 2010, 1996/1983) and a theory 
of perception (Searle 2015). As the theory of perception is an extension of 
the theory of intentionality, I will deal with them jointly. Searle considers the 
philosophy of language to be a branch of the philosophy of mind, understood 
as a study of the capacities of the mind to relate the organism to the world, 
and whereas the theory of speech acts (1996/1969) was proposed before the 
theory of intentionality, Searle characterizes the theory of intentionality as a 
foundation for the theory of speech acts (Searle1996/1983:vii). Th e relation 
between language and intentionality is described, as closely as possible, as the 
following: “Th e limits of meaning are the limits of intentionality, and it is a 
consequence of our analysis of intentionality that there is a limited number of 
things you can do with language” (Searle 1999:151). I believe that this is the 
right way to approach the relation between language, humans, and the world. 
Th e starting point of the study that has given rise to some of the observations 
presented here is that a theory of language must be founded on a theory of 
our relation to the world as a species, including a theory of intentionality and 
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perception. However, my claim is that the problem we have encountered in 
the analysis and classifi cation of questions is contingent on and can be located 
to specifi c assumptions of intentionality and perception that characterize 
Searle’s theory. More precisely, my claim is that the observed discrepancies are 
a consequence of misleading assumptions about what our attention is directed 
at in the environment, what we perceive, and how we do it. Th e main purpose 
of this article is to raise awareness of the inadequacies of these assumptions and 
thereby pave the way for informative and accurate analyses and classifi cations 
of questions and other speech acts. In this section, I will present the key 
assumptions in Searles theory of intentionality and perception. 
       Searle presents his theory of perception in opposition to theories 
characterized by the assumption that perception is not direct, but mediated 
by representations of the world, be it conceptual structures, categories, 
impressions, sense data, propositions, or the like. Th is assumption has been 
dominant in Western philosophy since Descartes and has led to a number of 
philosophical problems, including skepticism and the mind-body problem. 
Searle proposes to solve these problems by simply abandoning the assumption 
of indirect perception. Th us, Searle’s theory implies that we have direct access 
to the world, i.e. that we do not have to perceive anything before we perceive 
something in the world. I share this assumption. So, what is crucial in the 
current discussion of the basis of an analysis and classifi cation of questions is 
not whether we perceive directly. What is crucial is what we perceive directly. 
      Searle’s theory of perception is based on a theory of intentionality. 
Perception is considered a form of intentionality. Intentionality is that feature 
of the mind by which it is “directed at or about or of object and states of aff airs 
in the world” (Searle 2015, 1999, 1996/1983). Th is concept of intention must 
not be confused with intention in the sense of intending. Intending is just one 
of the ways in which our mind is directed at something or is about something 
in the world. A motorist on a highway may intend to change lanes, but the 
motorist may also hate to change lanes, hope to change lanes and see that 
another motorist is changing lanes. All these relations between the driver’s 
mind and a lane change are examples of intentionality according to the above 
concept of intention. A theory of intentionality is fundamental to a theory of 
language use because it covers the aboutness aspect, i.e. the fact that when we 
talk, we talk about something. Virtually all analyses of a linguistically conveyed 
unit of information are based on an assumption of aboutness. Th at goes for the 
reference-predicate analysis and the topic-comment analysis. Th at is, when a 
theory of language use is based on a theory of intentionality, speaking/writing 
and listening to/reading about something is considered to be a more specifi c 
case of directing one’s attention to something. 
      According to Searle (2015), intentionality is a biological phenomenon. As a 
biological phenomenon, intentionality can be regarded as a result of evolution 
and thus something that provides an edge in the niches of humans and animals. 
Simon Borchmann
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (20-55)
34
As the biologically primitive forms of intentionality, Searle mentions conscious 
perception, intentional action, hunger, thirst, and such emotions as anger, 
lust, and fear. Belief, desire, and hope, on the other hand, are derivative (Searle 
2015:33). Th e general term for all these forms of intentionality is ‘intentional 
state’. Th e central assumption in Searle’s theory of perception is that one can 
distinguish between intentional states, on the one hand, and what we perceive, 
on the other. Intentional states are our experiences of what we perceive, and they 
are ontologically subjective, i.e. they exist only as experienced by a human or an 
animal subject. What we perceive, on the other hand, is ontologically objective, 
i.e. it exists independent of any experience. According to Searle, what we direct 
our mind to and perceive directly are objects and states of aff airs. Objects and 
states of aff airs are not defi ned, but they are characterized as something that, 
unlike experience, has a “more or less permanent existence” (Searle 2015:67). 
Furthermore, they are something that can satisfy an intentional state, in other 
words, they are facts. Examples of objects include a computer screen, books, 
papers, a table, a chair, and a dog; examples of states of aff airs include that 
a blue book is on top of a brown table and that it is raining. Th e basis for 
this – somewhat unrefl ective – assumption of what we perceive directly is 
something we will return to in Section 7. Th e theory of perception must solve 
the epistemological problems associated with the assumption that what we 
perceive, is merely an ontological subjective representation of the ontological 
objective. Searle deals with this by distinguishing between intentional states 
with objects and intentional states without objects. Th e intentional states that 
characterize perception are of the fi rst type. For these states, it holds that they 
are causally dependent on their object. And the theory implies that awareness 
of this causal relationship is intrinsic to the intentional state. Th is property 
of intentional states is called causal self-refl exivity (Searle 2015:58). States 
without objects, on the other hand, are not causally conditioned by objects, but 
have internal causes (Searle 2015:19). Against this background a distinction 
is made between representations and presentations. Searle writes: “When I 
think about something, my thoughts are representations of whatever it is that 
I am thinking about. But when I directly perceive it - when, for example, I see 
it - then my visual experiences are actual presentations of the object and state 
of aff airs seen” (Searle 2015:41). Presentation is a subspecies of representation 
(Searle 2015:75) that diff ers from other representations by being causal self-
refl exive. 
      Whereas intentional states diff er as regards causal self-refl exivity, Searle 
nonetheless assumes that they have the same structure. Th us, every intentional 
state consists of a content and a psychological mode (Searle 2015:33). Content 
covers the experiential part of the intentional state. It is described as “an 
impression that this is how things are” (Searle 2015:56). Content, however, 
is a metaphorical term for thought processes that are fi rst and foremost 
characterized by their function, namely that they determine conditions of 
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satisfaction, i.e. how the world must be if the intentional state is satisfi ed. 
A mode is a psychological state that relates the content to the world. It 
encompasses all the psychological states that are directed towards something, 
for example, belief, desire, fear, hope, and perception. Th e content can basically 
be related to the world in two ways as described using the concept of direction 
of fi t we encountered in the analysis of speech acts in section 2. Either the 
content fi ts the world, or the world must change so that it fi ts the content. As 
to perceptions, beliefs, and event memories, they are “supposed to fi t how 
a world is. Th ey have the mind-to-world direction of fi t” (Searle 2015:35). 
Hence, they are satisfi ed. “Desires and intentions are not supposed to fi t how 
the world is, but how we would like it to be or how we intend to make it. 
Th ey have the world-to-mind direction of fi t” (Searle 2015:35). Th ey are not 
satisfi ed.
      Th e last feature Searle associates with intentional states is that they never 
occur alone, but always come as part of a network of intentional states, and 
that the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state are determined in 
relation to the network. As an example, he mentions that in order to believe 
that Obama is president, you must believe that the United States has a 
government, that it is a republic, that there are presidential elections to elect 
the government’s leader etc. To describe this relation between an intentional 
state and other states, Searle uses the term Network. In connection with this 
term, Searle notes that perception takes place on the background of abilities 
and capacities (Searle 2015:37,44), and that the same visual stimuli will 
produce totally diff erent reactions in people depending on these background 
capacities (Searle 2015:74). Some of these abilities are innate, others cultural. 
      It is evident here that there is a correlation between the analysis of 
intentional states and the analysis of speech acts. Just as a speech act includes 
a determination of conditions of satisfaction, namely the proposition, and 
a feature that relates the conditions of satisfaction to the world, namely the 
force indicator, an intentional state includes a determination of conditions of 
satisfaction, namely the content, and a feature that relates the conditions of 
satisfaction to the world, namely the mode. Searle pulls no punches in pointing 
out this similarity. In several places Searle even writes that intentional states 
have propositions as content. Although some formulations give the impression 
that intentional states with a proposition as content are merely a subset of 
intentional states, Searle writes that it applies “in general” (Searle 2015:14) 
that intentional states are satisfi ed or not satisfi ed, and that the content of the 
intentional state determines its conditions of satisfaction. Th us, the content of 
an intentional state has the same function as a proposition of a speech act. 
      By identifying and explaining this similarity in structure and function, 
Searle has grounded his theory of speech acts in a theory of intentionality 
and perception. Th is close relation may also be seen as a refl ection of Searle’s 
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principle of expressibility (Searle 1996/1969:19-21), i.e. all that can be meant 
can be said. Th e correlation between content and mode, on the one hand, 
and the proposition and force indicator, on the other, means that we can not 
only express a state of aff airs, but also how we relate to the state of aff airs, 
whether we hope, want, believe, intend, or fear it, etc. If truth conditions are 
the starting point, this is certainly a major step forward towards an informative 
and accurate semantics and grammar of everyday languages.
    
6. Intentionality and perception in everyday life
We can now compare Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception with the 
intentional states that the utterances (4), (5), and (6) are indications of. Th e 
basis for determining what the speakers direct their attention to and what 
they perceive is a cognitive ethnographic (Hutchins 1995) study of the activity 
of soaring in two Danish soaring clubs, with particular regard to the role of 
language in the pursuit of this activity. Th e study is motivated by systematic 
discrepancies between the established descriptions of information structure, 
on the one hand, and the use of language in everyday life, on the other 
(Borchmann 2019). Th e purpose of the study is to discover and describe the 
socio-cognitive tasks that language serves. Th e theoretical foundation is that 
human communication relies on a common ground and an ability for shared 
intentionality, originally evolved in the context of collaborative activities, 
providing for an especially salient and solid common ground (Tomasello 
2008). In line with this, it is assumed that language evolves in and is embedded 
in non-communicative activities (Linell 2004, Wittgenstein 2009/1953, 
Vygotsky 1978, Malinowski 1969/1923). It is through the contribution of 
language to life-sustaining activities that a selection pressure is exerted on the 
ability to acquire a language (Deacon 1997). Th e methodological implication 
of this theoretical foundation is that the language must be studied as part 
of an activity. Th is linguistic approach can be called ecological pragmatics 
(Borchmann 2018, Hodges 2009). Th is study extends over three years of 
participatory observations and includes participation in tuition, exams, ground 
staff  work, aircraft  maintenance, 200 hours of fl ight, and data collection in the 
form of audio recordings, video recordings with head mounted camera, texts, 
observations, interviews, diaries and fi eld notes. In the cognitive analysis of 
the situations, I rely on the speech acts that are included in the situations, 
the non-linguistic actions and events that precede, accompany, and follow the 
speech acts, and on observations of what comprises important information 
for glider pilots, what sources of information they use, their procedures for 
gathering and sharing information, and the search strategies they use. Th e 
cognitive analysis is supplemented and supported by studies of visual attention 
in everyday activities. In the comparison, I will concentrate on situation (4) 
and use situation (5) and situation (6) exclusively to provide perspective. Th e 
reason for this is that it is situation (4) that questions the foundations of Searle’s 
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theory of intentionality and perception. If what Searle calls ‘the content of our 
intentional states’ could be insuffi  ciently specifi c, even when the ontologically 
objective part of the world we direct our attention to is immediately available, 
the content of our intentional states could be inadequate in every conceivable 
situation. In this case, Searle’s theory could be misleading in general.
      As a preliminary point I will establish what the speaker directs his attention 
to in situation (4) and show that Searle’s distinction between the ontological 
objective entities and our ontological subjective experiences has decisive 
explanatory value. What the speaker directs his attention to in situation (4) 
is present, and thus directly available to perception. Th e speaker’s attention is 
directed to the cloud base. Th e cloud base is both the subject of attention in 
the speaker’s non-linguistic acts of lift ing his head and looking up, performed 
immediately prior to the speech act (4), and in the speaker’s speech act (4), 
motivated by the inadequate result of the non-linguistic act. Furthermore, 
the speaker, along with the other pilots, has directed his attention to the 
cloud base several times in the minutes prior to situation (4) as well as at the 
pre-fl ight briefi ng an hour and a half prior to (4). In fact, even in the days 
leading up to the fl ight, the speaker has directed his attention to the cloud base 
several times by reading weather forecasts. Th e reason why the speaker pays 
so much attention to the cloud base is that it is one of the lawful constraints 
that determine his action possibilities as a glider pilot. Among other things, 
the cloud base determines the usable height in the upcoming fl ight. Th e cloud 
base is generally important in aviation because it determines visibility. For 
these reasons, the cloud base is a well-established topic of communication 
in aviation: there are precise, standardized instruments to measure the cloud 
base, common terms, phraseology, and units to communicate about the cloud 
base, and well-established channels for sharing information about the cloud 
base and related factors. Th e aviation-specifi c weather forecasts the speaker 
checks in the days before the fl ight, thus, comprise specifi c information about 
the cloud base and related factors, for example:
 
Figure 3. Weather forecast for pilots provided by an independent publisher. 
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Cloud bases are ontologically objective properties of the world. Th ey are 
parts of the weather system, conditioned by the sun’s eff ect on the earth and 
the earth’s rotation, and they exist independently of our experience of them. 
One can argue that the perception of cloud bases depends on the perceptual 
system of humans and on the perceptual ability of the individual, that we as 
humans select the cloud base as the property we direct our attention to among 
an infi nite set of properties of the environment, that this selection is guided 
by human interests, and that these interests are a result of the alteration of 
the environment by humans, including the construction of aircraft  and 
the possibilities they provide. But that does not change the fact that there 
is also a cloud base if we do not direct our attention to it, nor that it varies 
independently of our experience of it. Th is ontological status is crucial for the 
understanding of the speaker’s relation to the world. A change in the speaker’s 
experience of the cloud base will not change the action possibilities the cloud 
base provides in a given situation, since these are lawfully determined (Turvey 
1992, Turvey et al 1981, Gibson 1986/1979) and vary independently of his 
experience. Th is is precisely why the speaker could consider the information 
he picks up by means of the non-linguistic action to be insuffi  cient, this is 
precisely why he seeks another more reliable source of information than his 
own perception, and this is precisely why he continuously seeks to update his 
experience of the cloud base. Th us, Searle’s distinction between ontologically 
objective and ontologically subjective has decisive explanatory value for 
the speaker’s behavior in situation (4). Situation (5) diff ers from (4) in that 
the subject of attention is not available to perception. Th e payment of the 
sandwich is a past event. Furthermore, to pay is an institutional fact (Searle 
1995:27, 1996/1969:50); pay designates a status function that humans impose 
on physical acts (Searle 1995:41), and it is thus not something that exists 
independently of any human experience. However, the physical act that we 
impose a status function on can be considered ontologically objective, and it is 
a prerequisite for imposing the status function and for the explanation of why 
the speaker acts as he does in situation (5): he must believe that someone has 
performed the physical act that counts as paying. Situation (6) is similar to (4) 
in that the subject of attention is available for perception, albeit the speaker 
would have to make a time-consuming physiological eff ort to perceive it (see 
section 4). However, the state of the harness system diff ers from entities like 
the cloud base in that it is a property of a human-engineered, controllable 
system. As Gibson (1986/1979) puts it, it is a property of the environment that 
man has converted to change what it aff ords him. In that respect, it may be 
considered to be ontological objective, i.e. something that exists independently 
of the speaker’s experience of it, and this status helps to explain why the speaker 
acts like she does with language. So, Searle’s distinction between ontologically 
objective and subjective also has an explanatory value as regards situations like 
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situation (5) and situation (6). Th at is, as regards Searle’s basic naïve realistic 
assumption, I believe it is the right basis for an analysis of these situations.  
      However, when we compare Searle’s description of what we direct our 
attention to with situation (4), there is a discrepancy. Th e cloud base is not an 
object. Th e cloud base is the vertical distance between a level on the ground (fi eld 
elevation or mean sea level) and the level where air reaches 100% saturation, 
condenses, and the water in the air becomes visible to the human eye. It is thus 
a spatial relation between diff erent substances in diff erent forms, and it can be 
specifi ed mathematically. Th e cloud base is also not a state of aff airs – at least 
not if the state of aff airs has a “more or less permanent existence” (see section 
5), since the cloud base varies continuously. Since it involves a constrained 
and structured variation, it may be considered a (permanent) property of the 
world. However, when the speaker directs his attention to the cloud base, he 
does so precisely due to its capacity to change. It is the present state of the 
variation that determines the speaker’s action possibilities and to which he 
adapts his actions, and the state is changing continuously. Th is relation not 
only applies to the cloud base, but to a number of other variations in the pilot’s 
environment: the wind direction, the windspeed, the wind gradient, the dew 
point, the color of the cloud base, the shape of the cloud base, the shape of 
the edge of the cloud top, the height of the cloud, the cloud cover, the solar 
radiation, the airspeed, the ground speed, the altitude, the height, the course, 
the distance to terminal areas, the distance to the next waypoint, the distance 
to the nearest airfi eld, the vertical speed, the thermal strength, the bank angle, 
the pitch, the yaw, the distance between thermals, etc. Indeed, what the glider 
pilot in situation (4) directs his attention to in general is variations.
      Once you realize that what the speaker is directing his attention to in 
situation (4) is a variation, it becomes clear that the same applies to situations 
(5) and (6). Th e individual who paid for the sandwich may well be considered 
an object; but it is not that particular individual that the speaker directs his 
attention to. He cannot do so, because he doesn’t know who it is. What he 
knows is that someone has paid, and that he has to pay whoever has paid. Th is 
knowledge is part of his ability to participate in a social system that enables 
the exchange of goods and services. Th is part of his knowledge corresponds 
to what has been described in schema theory as a slot or a terminal in a 
memory structure (Minsky 1975, 1985). Th e essential point is that the one 
who pays varies from situation to situation. Hence, what the speaker directs 
his attention to is a variation – not in a weather system, but in a social system 
of status functions. And unlike the cloud base, the variation of which is 
lawfully determined, this variation is controllable and regulated by social 
norms and conventions. Furthermore, this variation diff ers from the cloud 
base in that there is not the same set of possibilities from situation to situation. 
In the current situation, there are two possibilities. But next time the speaker 
has to pay someone who has paid for something, there will be a new set of 
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possibilities. Th e practical task the speaker is faced with is to pay the one who 
has paid. To solve that task, he has to solve the cognitive task of fi nding out who 
has paid. Th is implies that he directs his attention to the variation. In situation 
(6), the speaker’s attention is directed at the state of the back-seat harness 
system. Th e harness is a small system attached to a seat in an aircraft  and can 
be in two states: fastened or released. Sometimes it is fastened, sometimes 
released. Unlike the cloud base, this system is controllable. It varies with the 
harness operator’s actions. Unlike the payer variation, the set of possibilities is 
the same in each situation, and unlike the cloud base, which includes a large 
set of possible states, it only includes two possible states. Th is is exactly why it 
can be handled and is handled with the binary yes/no question. Th us, the state 
of the harness system is also a variation. And for reasons of safety, the speaker 
must direct her attention to this variation and determine its state. Th at is, for 
all the situations of (4), (5), and (6) it applies that the speaker directs his or her 
attention to a variation. Th us, judging from the situations of (4), (5), and (6), 
Searle’s assumption as to which ontologically objective entities we direct our 
attention to is misleading.
       Th ere is also a discrepancy when we compare Searle’s description of the 
intentional states of perception with the speaker’s perception in situation 
(4). What the speaker must perceive in order to determine the cloud base by 
means of visual perception is a structure in stimuli (see fi gure 1). Th e speaker’s 
problem in situation (4) is that his perception is insuffi  cient relative to the 
solution of the task that motivates the allocation of attention to the cloud 
base, namely to decide whether to start now or wait. Th at’s why he radios the 
pilots in the air. Th us, the experiential component of the speaker’s intentional 
state of perception cannot be said to determine conditions of satisfaction. 
On the contrary, it is characterized by an inadequate specifi cation. If we 
attempt to defend Searle’s theory by claiming that what the pilot perceives is 
a defi ciency, and that the defi ciency represents the conditions of satisfaction, 
we are back in the solipsistic prison Searle is trying to free us from, namely 
the assumption that what we perceive is not the ontological objective entities, 
but our ontologically subjective experience of the ontological objective 
entities, i.e. the assumption of indirect perception. Hence, the theory cannot 
be saved by such ad hoc adjustments. It is also misleading as a description of 
the speakers’ intentional state in situation (5) and situation (6), i.e. situations 
where the speaker has no access or no immediate access to the necessary 
information. Th ese intentional states are also insuffi  cient as determinations 
of conditions of satisfaction. One can argue that the speaker in situation (6) 
could have a complete determination of conditions of satisfaction in the form 
of a representation of the harness system in one of the two possible states. But 
even if the variation only includes two possible states, it is of no benefi t to the 
speaker to form a representation of the variation in either of the two states. 
I have no evidence that the speaker did not form a representation, but it is 
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implausible, since the cognitive load of pilots – and not least pilot students – 
in the prefl ight check gives an incentive to avoid any unnecessary cognitive 
eff ort. And anyway, the representation is of no use to the pilot. She can just 
ask. In any case, Searle’s assumption that intentional states are representations 
or presentations that determine conditions of satisfaction is misleading as 
regards situations like (4) and (5). 
     Th e above analyses also demonstrate that directing one’s attention to 
something is not the same as perceiving it. Not even if what we direct our 
attention to is present and immediately available to perception as in situation 
(4). Directing one’s attention to something is an act, and perception is the 
possible result of directing one’s attention to something. What is crucial in 
describing situations such as (4) is that the act of directing one’s attention to 
something can be completed without it resulting in an intentional state that 
determines conditions of satisfaction. When Searle categorizes perception as 
a form of intentionality, he does not distinguish between the act of directing 
one’s attention to something and perceiving. Th ere are two problems with 
this. First, he does not take into account that perception for a large part must 
be learned. Although Searle emphasizes that perception must be learned, the 
analysis of intentional states assumes that the perceptual ability is complete. 
In situation (4), however, the speaker has not yet learned to diff erentiate the 
cloud base well enough by means of perceiving. He can perform the act of 
directing his attention to the cloud base, but the result of the act is inadequate. 
To be sure, Searle notes that every perception takes place on a background of 
abilities and capacities (Searle 2015:37), but what this does to perception, how 
the background is established, and the role played by perception in establishing 
this background is not clear. In any case, the assumption of background 
has no consequences for Searle’s analysis of intentional states. Secondly, the 
temporal aspect is ignored, the fact that directing one’s attention to something 
is something that takes place in time, and hence, that there is something that 
precedes, happens simultaneously with, and follows attentional acts. Searle 
does note that intentional states are processes and that they are parts of 
networks that determine an intentional state’s conditions of satisfaction. But 
this has no consequences for the analysis of intentional states. In other words, 
background and network appear to be two cogs in the theoretical machinery 
that can turn without anything else moving. 
      Regarding the use of situation (4) as a basis for evaluating a theory 
of perception, it can be objected that perception should be described on 
the basis of successful cases and not by means of errors or deviations. But 
the inadequacy of the perception in situation (4) is neither an error nor a 
deviation. Th e pilot must solve the cognitive task of selecting a future action. 
Appropriate selection requires information. Th e information he can pick up 
here and now is insuffi  cient relative to the solution of the cognitive task of 
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selecting a future action. Th erefore, he performs an act to provide the required 
information. First, he raises his head and looks towards the sky, and then he 
asks the pilots in the air. Both these acts are motivated by the inadequacy of 
the perception relative to the specifi c requirements of the cognitive task, and 
guided by the requirements. Indeed, it may be argued that the inadequacy of 
intentional states is a general condition in the skillful practitioner’s pursuit 
of activities in a dynamic environment. Studies of the visual attention of 
humans engaged in activities show that their gaze shift s from one region of 
the environment to another continuously. For example, the gaze of a driver 
steering through dense traffi  c will shift  at approximately half-second intervals 
from the car in front, to oncoming traffi  c, to the car in front, to the open 
roadway, to the near-side off road etc. (Land & Tatler 2012 7:20). In trying to 
answer the question of what drives such sequences, studies with head-mounted 
eye trackers have established an intimate link between visual attention and the 
current action goals (see Tatler & Land 2015 for a review). Fixations are highly 
constrained to task-relevant information (Land & Tatler 2012 3, Rothkopf et 
al 2007, Hayhoe & Balard 2005), and the temporal patterns of fi xations are 
largely determined by the action sequences (Land & Tatler 2012 3:29). Th us, 
vision leads action by about 0.5-1 second in a number of diff erent activities 
(Tatler & Land 2015). Th at is, where we attend is not determined top-down 
by saliency, but guided top-down by tasks. Visual attention does more than 
support the immediate task. Some fi xations are look-aheads, i.e. fi xations on 
information not relevant to the immediate task, but relevant for a future task 
(Pelz & Canosa 2001:3593). In line with these observations, Tatler and Land 
(2015) suggest that it is appropriate to consider attention “not as an isolated 
system, but as part of a broader network of vision, action, planning during 
interactions with the environment” (Tatler & Land 2015:391). Th e greater lead 
time by the eyes over action is specifi c to experienced practitioners (Hayhoe 
et al 2012, Land 2006, Land & McLeod 2000), and more generally it could be 
argued that the perception of skillful practitioners is oriented towards future 
actions (Tatler & Land 2015, Foulsham 2014, Th omas & Riley 2014, Land & 
Tatler 2012, Buckley et al. 2011, Pelz & Canosa 2001, Land et al 1999, Patla & 
Vickers 1997, Land & Lee 1994). As to the adequacy of intentional states, the 
point is this: it may be that the perception of the driver who, 0.1 second ago, 
has directed his attention to the oncoming traffi  c, is adequate. However, in a 
few tenths of a second, the perception will be inadequate relative to the task the 
driver is engaged in. Th at is, because practitioners engaged in activities needs 
to control the ongoing action and select future actions, because the conditions 
for the practitioners’ control and selection of actions are constantly changing, 
and because they cannot pay attention to all these changes at once (Neumann 
Simon Borchmann
Scandinavian Studies in Language, 11(1), 2020 (20-55)
43
1990, Allport 1989, van der Heijden 1986), the inadequacy of perceptions 
is a general condition in the skillful practitioner’s pursuit of activities in a 
dynamic environment. Th is is exactly why their gaze shift s from one region of 
the environment to another continuously. Th ese movement are what Land & 
Tatler (2012 3:1) quite fi ttingly describe as “how our eyes question the world”.
      Th e inclusion of the temporal aspect also invites refl ection on Searle’s 
description of the causal relation between ontologically objective entities and 
ontologically subjective intentional states. Th e speaker’s perception in situation 
(4) is causally conditioned by the light’s infl uence on the retina according 
to optical laws. Th e observations give us no reason to doubt that, nor that 
this causal relation is in some sense intrinsic to the speaker’s perception. All 
the speaker’s actions indicate that he believes that reliable information can 
be collected from the environment - that there is a lawful relation between 
the structures in stimuli he can perceive and the opportunities for action 
the environment off ers him as a pilot. Indeed, the whole activity, e.g. the 
training of the pilots, the sources of information about the weather used by 
the pilots, the design of instruments and information systems, is based on 
this assumption. In that regard, Searle’s description of the relation is accurate. 
But it is a one-sided description compared to the speaker’s possibilities for 
choosing, delimiting, and changing the visual fi eld, i.e. by lift ing his head, 
turning his head, walking backwards, squinting his eyes, etc., and for choosing 
what his attention is directed at in the visual fi eld - whether it is the cloud base, 
the shape of the cloud base, the color of the cloud base, the shape of the edge of 
the cloud top, the height of the cloud top, the cloud cover, the layer of clouds 
etc. Th ese possibilities suggest that the perceiver’s relation to the stimuli that 
surround him may be regarded as a mutual causal relation. Directing attention 
to something is an act that has a certain informative eff ect, given that the 
environment is as it is. In other words, the speaker is manipulating his relation 
to the environment, and the environment is responding with information. 
Th us, it is a feedback loop of action and perception. Note that this does not 
mean that the speaker can determine what he perceives when he has chosen 
his visual fi eld and chosen to direct his attention to one particular variation 
rather than another. Th e state of the variation is independent of the perceptual 
act. So, we might say that the mutual causal relation is between a perceptual 
act and a variation, i.e. a set of possible states. Th e same applies to (5) and 
(6), although here the manipulation is based on a linguistic, conventionally 
mediated relation to the environment (Borchmann 2018, Golonka 2015, 
Harder 2010). 
     For the above reasons, Searle’s description of the relation between the 
content of intentional states and the world is insuffi  ciently informative. Th e 
actions in the situations of (4), (5), and (6) do not consist in making the world 
fi t the content of the intentional states of the perceiver. Th ey consist in engaging 
with the world. Th e starting point of the speech acts in these situations is an 
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inadequate specifi cation. Th e inadequacy motivates the speaker’s intentional 
action, and the result of the intentional action is a specifi cation. Th e speakers 
manipulate their relation to the world in order for the world to respond 
with information. Hence, it is not a relation of fi t between the content of an 
intentional state and the world, but a dynamic relation of acquiring information. 
When we compare Searle’s idea of  direction of fi t with the situations of (4), (5), 
and (6), its limitations become obvious. Th e idea implies that what we need 
is already specifi ed. Th ereby, it ignores the encounters with the world through 
which we acquire specifi cations.
      To summarize, when we compare the theory of intentionality and 
perception that forms the basis for Searle’s theory of speech acts with 
observations of people’s relations to the world in an everyday activity, several 
discrepancies appear. Th us, the problems with Searle’s theory of speech acts 
that we identifi ed in section 2 are not merely semantic details. Th ey are related 
to assumptions of intentionality and perception that confl ict with what we 
can observe in the situations that give rise to the speech acts. And it is these 
discrepancies that cause the problems. Th e assumptions that cause problems 
are: a) what we direct our attention to are objects and more or less permanent 
states of aff airs, b) the content of our intentional states determines conditions 
of satisfaction, c) there is a one-sided causal relation between ontologically 
objective entities and our intentional states, and d) the relation between our 
intentional states and the world is a relation of fi t. Th ese assumptions ignore 
the active, the interactive, and the dynamic aspects of intentionality and 
perception. In the next section, I will consider the origin of the discrepancies, 
and on the basis of these considerations I will explain why Searle’s theory of 
intentionality and perception is insuffi  cient as a basis for a general theory of 
speech acts.
 
7. Intentionality and perception in idle and intentionality and perception 
in operation
7.1. Two diff erent phenomena
It is surprising that some quite simple observations of ordinary situations in 
daily life can challenge a carefully conceived, nuanced, coherent philosophical 
theory - a theory that is an extension of and relates to a long philosophical 
tradition of other carefully conceived, nuanced and coherent philosophical 
theories. Th is holds especially when the theory considers perception to be 
a biological phenomenon. How can the assumptions about our relation to 
the world as humans diff er so signifi cantly from the relation we can observe 
in an activity of everyday life? Surely, the question we are trying to answer 
is whether Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception is suffi  cient as a 
basis for a general theory of speech acts. But answering the question about 
the causes of the discrepancies helps to clarify whether or not the theory is 
suffi  cient.
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     When trying to understand why there are discrepancies between Searle’s 
theory and what we can observe, it is informative to compare the three 
situations with the situation Searle uses as a starting point for the analysis of 
intentionality and perception. Th is situation is described in the following: 
Let us describe a more realistic scene: I am now looking at San Francisco 
Bay out of the upstairs study of my house in Berkeley. I see the city of 
Berkeley in the foreground, the Bay in the background, and on the distant 
horizon the city of San Francisco, the Golden Gate Bridge, and the hills of 
the Peninsula. In the immediate foreground, I also see the table on which I 
am working, the computer with its illuminated screen, various books and 
papers on the table, and my dog, Tarski, sitting on the fl oor at my feet. Th is 
is a continuous visual experience and I can shift  my attention at will. I can 
even shift  my attention without shift ing my eyes. I can focus my attention 
on diff erent aspects of the scene. Sometimes, for the sake of simplicity, in 
this discussion I will concentrate on certain elements, for example, seeing 
the table, but we should keep the complexity of this scene in mind as we 
proceed. (Searle 2015:53) 
In introducing this example, Searle criticizes the philosophical tradition for 
presenting overly simple examples of perception such as seeing a lump of wax 
or a tomato. As set out above, Searle considers it important that the example is 
realistic. Nevertheless, there are a number of very notable diff erences between 
the situation Searle describes and the three real situations we have compared 
his theory to in section 6. Th e fi rst thing immediately noticeable is that the 
intentionality in Searle’s example appears to be random. First, he directs his 
attention to Berkeley (no pun intended), then the Bay, then San Francisco, 
then the Golden Gate Bridge, then the hills of the Peninsula, then his table, 
then his computer, then various books and papers, and then his dog. It is 
unclear why he directs his attention to these things, and why he does it in that 
order. Th ere is no clear pattern or guiding principle. Th e only organization 
of the sequence is ‘fi rst something far away, then something close by’, and the 
only delimitation of the set of subjects of attention is ‘what can be seen from 
this place’. In contrast, the intentionality in the situations of (4), (5), and (6) 
is targeted and systematic. Th e speakers direct their attention to variations in 
the environment, the states of which are relevant to the solution of tasks they 
are confronted with, and the sequences are determined by the requirements of 
the tasks and the results of directing attention to a variation. In situation (6), 
for example, the allocation of attention to the state of the harness system in 
the rear seat is part of a procedure for allocating attention to a set of variables 
in the overall fl ight system. Th e guiding principle is relevance with regard to 
the realization of the values that  guide  the solutions of the tasks, in situation 
(6) fi rst and foremost safety and effi  ciency. Another characteristic diff erence 
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is that Searle’s situation is static. Nothing happens, and the perceiver does 
nothing except move his gaze. In contrast, the situations of (4), (5), and (6) 
are dynamic. Everything that is relevant to the speaker is changing, and the 
speakers are actively seeking information as they solve practical tasks based on 
the information they pick up through their intentional acts. In situation (4), 
for example, the speaker lift s his head in order to pick up information about 
the continuously changing cloud base, because he needs to decide when to 
perform the practical task of taking off . A third characteristic diff erence is that 
each intentional state in Searle’s situation appears fragmented and isolated. 
Th e only relation between them is that they belong to a presentation of the 
same “scene” - whatever the meaning of that metaphor is. Searle does write 
that we focus our attention on certain aspects, but which aspects he focusses 
on, and how these aspects are related to each other, is not clear in the example. 
Likewise, the sequence of intentional states from Berkeley to the dog is not 
related to prior states or states that follow. In contrast, the speakers’ intentional 
states in the situations of (4), (5), and (6), respectively, are all related to each 
other in that the ontologically objective variations they direct their attention to 
are variables in a dynamic system characterized by complex feedback relations 
between variables. And the fact that the speakers direct their attention to 
precisely these variables in the system is a result of their attunement to the 
system and a prerequisite for solving the tasks they are confronted with. In 
situation (4), for example, there is a complex reciprocal relation between the 
cloud base and the start time: on the one hand, the start time is determined 
by the cloud base, on the other hand, the requirement for the cloud base is 
determined by the distance of the planned task, which is determined by the 
start time. Th at is, if the value of one variable in the system changes, so do 
the values of all the other variables. And the set of intentional states of the 
situation is delimited by the actions and events that precede it and infl uences 
the actions and events that follow. In situation (4), the set of intentional states 
is delimited, among other things, by the night temperature, the waypoints in 
the scheduled task and the planned fl ight distance. And the set infl uences the 
start time, the speed, the strength of the thermals, the distance between the 
clouds, and the landing time. Th us, these intentional states are not isolated or 
fragmented, but are all embedded in a complex, dynamic system. 
      As noted in section 5, Searle emphasizes that intentional states only 
determine their conditions of satisfaction within a network of intentional 
states. However, in the example above, it is unclear what other intentional 
states determine the conditions of satisfaction. Th erefore, it is also unclear 
what the conditions of satisfaction are: How, for example, can we know that 
he perceives the city of Berkeley? What are the criteria for perceiving the 
city of Berkeley? In fact, the only criterion for perception in the example is 
that he uses the names of the cities, the bridge, the hills, and the objects he 
claims to perceive. But in a context where the aim is to base a theory of speech 
acts on a theory of intentionality and perception, this is not a criterion, but 
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circular reasoning. By contrast, the criteria are clear in the situations of (4), 
(5), and (6); there are simple concrete external criteria to which the respective 
speakers direct their attention, namely the cloud base, the person who paid for 
the sandwich, and the state of the back-seat harness system, and the criteria 
regarding whether or not they experience the ontologically objective states of 
these variations, namely the non-linguistic acts that follow the speech acts: in 
situation (4) that the speaker waits to start until the cloud base is 900 meters, 
in situation (5) that the speaker pays the person who paid for his sandwich, 
and in situation (6) that the speaker only takes off  if the passenger’s harness 
is fastened. Hence, a fourth characteristic diff erence between the situations of 
(4), (5), and (6) and Searle’s situation is that there are clear external criteria for 
intentionality and perception in the former, whereas there are no clear criteria 
for intentionality and perception in the latter. 
      Th e abovementioned four diff erences all express one and the same 
fundamental diff erence: the intentionality in the situations of (4), (5), and (6) 
is embedded in an activity governed by certain goals and values, determining 
what is relevant to pay attention to and setting the criteria for perception, 
whereas the intentionality in Searle’s situation is arbitrary and constitutes 
an activity in itself. Th e diff erence between what we can observe in the 
situations of (4), (5), and (6) and what Searle describes is clearly so great 
that we must conclude that we are dealing with two diff erent phenomena. 
Th e intentionality and perception that can be observed in the situations 
of (4), (5), and (6) are embedded in an activity, which means that they are 
targeted, systematic, dynamically oriented, adapted to a system characterized 
by complex feedback relations, and have clear external criteria for perception. 
Th is is intentionality and perception in operation. Th e subject of Searle’s 
description is intentionality and perception that are arbitrary, that is, random, 
statically oriented, fragmented, isolated, and without clear criteria, i.e. 
independent of practical life. I will call this intentionality and perception in 
idle. It may be that Searle’s concepts of network and background are designed 
precisely to account for the embeddedness of intentionality and perception, 
but the network and background do not appear to have any consequences 
for the perceptual activity in his example or the analysis of intentionality and 
perception. Th us, when Searle’s philosophical theory of consciousness diff ers 
from what can be observed in a cognitive ethnographic study, the reason for 
this is that the theory and the observations have diff erent scientifi c objects.
      It is very interesting to compare the example Searle uses with examples 
from everyday life such as the situations of (4), (5), and (6). For whereas 
Searle’s example appears to be realistic and compelling when you read it in 
the context of other philosophical works, it is suddenly disclosed as a bizarre 
activity: the perceiver is in his study alone, and then he starts mentioning the 
names of some of the cities, bridges, hills he can see from the window, and 
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some of the objects he can see in the room. It is possibly only philosophers, 
poets, and daydreamers that engage in such an activity (although it resembles 
certain name games played by children and adults that may serve diff erent 
meaningful purposes). One can only guess how Searle’s theory would have 
been developed if it had been based on an example of an ordinary activity 
where intentional acts and perception are subject to requirements, and where 
there is immediate, unambiguous, and concrete feedback if the person’s 
intentional acts and perceptions do not meet these requirements, e.g. driving a 
car, walking down a fl ight of stairs, making tea, feeding an infant, or whipping 
cream. But there are good reasons to believe that the theory would (and 
should) have been developed diff erently. 
7.2. Internal discrepancies in Searle’s presentation of the theory
Th e comparison above also points to two internal discrepancies in Searle’s 
presentation of the theory. Searle claims that perception is a biological 
phenomenon and compares the perception he describes with hunger. But 
whereas hunger clearly has a biological function, it is not clear what biological 
function the perceptual activity of looking out of his study window has. For 
example, what biological function is involved in looking at entities of the kind 
referred to by the words Berkeley, computer, and book, and why look at them in 
the order he does? If we apply an evolutionary perspective, it is also clear that 
hunger provides an edge, and that organisms with motivations to seek food are 
selected for. On the other hand, it is unclear how the perceptual ability Searle 
illustrates in his example provides an edge, and why and how the perceptual 
activity he describes exerts a selection pressure on perceptual systems. In 
other words, if we ask what we need to direct our attention to and perceive 
in order to survive, Berkeley and a book are not very convincing answers. 
To put Searle’s examples into perspective, the cloud base specifi es human’s 
possibilities for visual perception, and perceiving the cloud base is crucial to a 
number of life-sustaining activities, e.g. hunting, farming, and protecting our 
off spring against the cold. On the whole, we must assume that our perceptual 
system, including our ability to direct our attention to specifi c properties of 
the environment and perceive them, is hardly developed for the purpose of 
idling, i.e. for being random, statically oriented, fragmented, isolated, and 
independent of practical life. Th e perceptual system selected for is most likely 
the system that enables life-sustaining activities. Once this perceptual system 
has evolved, it is, of course, possible to perform the particular activity Searle 
illustrates. But this is not something the system has evolved for, and it is not an 
activity that characterizes perception as a biological phenomenon. When we 
consider what Searle describes as perception in a biological and evolutionary 
perspective, it appears to be an epiphenomenon of perception.
      Another discrepancy emerges if we try to consider what Searle is doing 
in the example above, relative to the assumption of direct perception. What 
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he is doing is mentioning the names of some towns, a bridge, some hills, and 
a small number of objects in his offi  ce. Th e words he uses are not words that 
indicate which aspect you should direct your attention to, e.g. what it can be 
used for, how it relates to something else, or other concrete sensory properties 
that make it relevant for the perceiver to direct attention to it and provide 
clear criteria for perception. Th e terms are abstract; they are constructed or 
derived categories of places and things, and they can only be learned once we 
have acquired a language. A child in the prelinguistic phase cannot direct his 
or her attention to and perceive Berkeley, San Francisco, Golden Gate Bridge, 
the Hills of the Peninsula, a table, a computer, a book, or an article. What 
it can perceive is if something aff ords sucking, drinking, warmth, burning, 
overturning, walking, seating, throwing, pushing, moving, pressing, tearing, 
curling, bumping into, seeing through etc. In other words, a child does not 
diff erentiate the environment in the categories Searle uses in the example. To 
put Searle’s examples into perspective, a child in the pre-linguistic age can 
perceive the cloud base. Clearly though, a child cannot diff erentiate the cloud 
base well enough relative to the pursuit of a range of activities, but the child 
can perceive whether the air’s saturation of water is above or below 100%, 
and it can perceive the diff erence between a cloud base of 1000 meters and 0 
meters. Th is is not something to be acquired through language. Most of the 
ways of diff erentiating the environment that Searle illustrates in the example 
are abstract, more or less constructed, and can only be acquired linguistically. 
With Searle’s own distinctions, words such as Berkeley, San Francisco, computer, 
book, and article are used to refer to status functions, and thus ontologically 
subjective, observer-dependent, institutional facts rather than ontologically 
objective, observer-independent, brute facts. Th is means that the experience 
of them is mediated. Contrary to Searle’s intention, his own example casts 
doubt on whether we perceive directly. In any case, it is very diffi  cult to argue 
that what Searle illustrates in his example is direct perception. More than 
anything else, it appears to be categorization. On this point, I cannot help 
having the impression that it is the theory of intentionality and perception 
that is based on the theory of speech acts, including predication, rather than 
the other way around.
      In summary, if one wants to base a theory of speech acts on a theory of 
intentionality and perception in operation, Searle’s theory is not an obvious 
candidate. Furthermore, if the theory we are looking for is a theory of direct 
perception, Searle’s theory is not a very convincing proposal.
8. Conclusion
In section 3, I have shown that Searle’s analysis and classifi cation of speech 
acts is misleading when applied to three common, simple, semantic variants 
of questions in everyday language use. I have traced this inadequacy back to 
the theory of intentionality and perception that forms the basis of the theory 
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of speech acts. In section 6, I have shown that the theory of intentionality 
and perception is insuffi  ciently informative and misleading in relation to 
the intentionality and perception we can observe in the situations in which 
these three questions arise. In section 7, I have explained these discrepancies 
between Searle’s theory, on the one hand, and observations of everyday life’s 
intentionality and perception, on the other, by the fact that the theory and the 
observations have diff erent objects: Th e intentionality and perception we can 
observe in everyday life are intentionality and perception in operation. What 
Searle describes are intentionality and perception in idle. 
      In assessing Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception as a basis for 
an analysis and classifi cation of speech acts, one must take into account the 
knowledge interests by which it is driven. Here, it may be relevant to note that 
Searle’s theory is a philosophical theory, and that it relates to philosophical 
issues. When the theory concentrates on objects and permanent states 
of aff airs, describes intentional states as conditions of satisfaction, and 
determines the relation between intentional states and the world as a one-
sided causal relation, it is most likely a consequence of the fact that it deals with 
epistemological questions such as ‘what is knowledge?’, and ‘how do we know 
that we know what we know?’. Furthermore, as the theory of intentionality 
and perception is to form the basis of a philosophical theory of language, it 
must enable the theory of language to answer epistemological questions such 
as ‘what do we mean when we say that something is true?’ and ‘what have we 
committed ourselves to when we have made a scientifi c claim?’. Th erefore, 
references to objects and specifi cations of truth conditions (whatever we call 
them) are fundamental both in the theory of intentionality and perception 
and in the theory of speech acts. Th at is, Searle’s theories are primarily driven 
by an epistemological interest. Against this background, one might ask why I 
compare such theories with situations in everyday life. Th ere are two reasons 
for this. First of all, Searle claims that what he describes is everyday language 
use and perception and that his examples are realistic. Secondly, a wide range 
of linguistic descriptions rely on Searle’s analysis and classifi cation in the 
description of everyday language use. Th erefore, it is legitimate and relevant to 
compare Searle’s theories with situations in everyday life and to draw attention 
to what one subscribes to if one bases a description of language and language 
use on Searle’s analysis and classifi cation of speech acts.
      Of course, this does not mean that the above epistemological questions 
are not important. However, it is not given that a linguistic description of 
everyday language use should answer such questions. Th is article is written 
from the point of view that a description of everyday language use should be 
informative and accurate, i.e. it must identify the tasks that language fulfi lls 
in everyday life and provide a basis for accurate predictions of how, including 
by means of which structures, in which situations, and with which eff ects, it 
fulfi lls these tasks. It could be argued that, in principle, a description could 
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serve both an epistemological purpose and the aforementioned purpose. 
But what the observations of intentionality and perception in daily life have 
shown is precisely that there is a diff erence between the ideal situation we are 
in when we make a scientifi c claim and the actual situation we are in when we 
solve the practical tasks that we are confronted with in daily life. Judging from 
the situations of (4), (5), and (6), people’s psychological basis for a speech act 
in the activities of daily life is not necessarily a specifi cation of how the world 
must be if the speaker’s intentional state is satisfi ed, but oft en an inadequate 
specifi cation. Th e relation between intentional states and the world is not a 
one-sided causal relation in daily life, but rather a feedback loop of action 
and perception. People do not seek truth values, but specifi c action-guiding 
information. Th e question of truth does not seem to play a particularly 
important role in the language use of everyday activities, but is settled prior 
to language use by the choice of the source of information. People do not pay 
attention to objects and more or less permanent states of aff airs in the pursuit 
of daily activities, but to variations. People’s requirements for linguistically 
conveyed information are not that this information fi ts the world, but that it 
is suffi  ciently specifi c to allow the selection of an action that contributes to 
the solution of a practical task. Th erefore, the tasks that language fulfi lls in 
daily life are also diff erent from the ones it ideally fulfi lls in scientifi c work. 
Th erefore, we must expect that the speech acts we perform in everyday life are 
diff erent from those performed as part of a scientifi c work. And therefore, we 
must also expect that the semantic structures of these speech acts diff er from 
those assumed and focused on in an epistemologically oriented description 
of language. Th us, Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception is not a 
suffi  cient basis for a general theory of speech acts of everyday life. 
      If we want to make an accurate and informative analysis and provide a 
functional characteristic of speech acts of the type I have analyzed in the 
examples in this article – three simple common, semantic variants of questions 
- we need to base our analysis and characteristics on an alternative theory of 
intentionality and perception. In Borchmann (2018, 2016), I have proposed 
Gibson’s theory of perception, including his theory of aff ordances and 
information, as such a foundation. Using this theory as a basis for a study of 
language, we will discover a) a number of socio-cognitive tasks that language 
serves in addition to referring to objects, categorizing objects and representing 
state of aff airs, b) an alternative to the semantic structure of predication, and 
c) alternatives to the semantic functions of reference and predication. Th ese 
discoveries are vital to an accurate and informative semantic and grammatical 
description of a given language. 
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Notes
1 Searle’s argument for basing the analysis on the so-called simple case is: “Until 
we can get clear about the simple cases we are hardly likely to get clear about the 
more complicated ones” (Searle 1996/1969:33). Thus, Searle simply presuppos-
es that F(referring and predicating) is the simple case.
2 Searle (1996/1969) does provide representations of the semantic form of ques-
tions. For example, ”How many people were at the party” is represented as “?(X 
number of people were at the party)”, and “Why did he do it?” is represented as 
“?(He did it because ...)” (Searle 1996/1969:31). However, as will be shown in 
this section, these representations raise a number of issues, and these issues are 
not addressed by Searle.  
3  In the article I will use the numerals (4), (5) and (6) to refer to the speech acts and 
situation (4), situation (5), and situation (6) to refer to the situations in which the 
speech acts occur.
4  I prefer the notion ‘listener’ because it emphasizes that this party of the 
communication is motivated and active and participates intentionally.
5  The wording of the complete transmission is: ”hotel delta november ni hvad er 
skybasen” (hotel delta November nine what is the cloud base). Hotel delta iden-
tifi es the receiver, november ni identifi es the sender.   
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